The text analyzes the contradictions, ambiguities and accommodations underlying the remodelling of Portugal from an imperial metropolis into a European post-colonial nation. It focuses on two interrelated and contradictory facets of national redefinition -namely, the incorporation of Portuguese transnational migrants into the nation and Portugal's transformation into a receptor of immigrants from its former colonies. Key words: Portugal, postcoloniality, immigrants.
Since the cultural meanings engendered by images are mediated by our experiences, as a Brazilian anthropologist interested in comparing old and new Atlantic crossings of people, signs, and capital between Portugal and Brazil, the image of a boat aground in the Portuguese sea, acquires yet another broader meaning. It becomes an allegory of five centuries of Portuguese colonialism, the phantom of a decaying empire that came to an abrupt end only 30 years ago, brushed away by the short lived 1974 Socialist Revolution of the Carnations. As a symbol of the Empire, this image brings back to my mind multiple layers of the Portuguese colonial past. One such layer is of course that of the fifteenth and sixteenth century caravels exploring and colonizing new lands. Another, set in the sixteenth century, exposes an Empire unable to compete in the marketplace of global commerce, that «distanced» itself from Europe to engage in Atlantic projects directed, first towards colonizing and exploring Brazil (1640 Brazil ( -1822 , which is still considered to be its major creation, and turning, after Brazil's ambiguous independence, to Portuguese Africa. Still one more interrelated layer depicts the face of an emerging Immigrant Portugal in the early nineteenth century, when massive contingents of poverty-stricken Portuguese, in their attempts to escape to the New World (mostly to Brazil) were confronted with intense surveillance at Portugal's territorial borders. At least up to the 1950s, colonial officers defined emigrants as second and third class citizens and illegal migration as a crime. And while deriving revenues from their emigrants' remittances, the impoverished imperial metropolis viewed emigration as a necessary evil. It was only after the 1974 Revolution, upon the dissolution of Empire and Portugal's almost simultaneous deterritorialization to the European community space, that the Portuguese diasporic population was to be incorporated into a global nation based on the bounds of blood and thus entitled to dual nationality and citizenship rights. Since the creation of this global nation continues to be rooted in the collective memory of saudade as the basis of national identity, the Portuguese diaspora seems to have replaced the former overseas colonies in the spatial (re)imagining of the Empire.
As an emblem of Portugal's long-lasting decayed empire, the old ship aground provides a way of considering the contradictions, ambiguities and dilemmas underlying the dissolution of the five-century long Portuguese Empire and the remodeling of Portugal into a European post-colonial nation that favors the «bonds of blood» and thus the rights to roots, rather than territory in the present context of global capitalism. In an attempt at unveiling the paradoxes underlying the production of imperial continuities in this era of contemporary globalization, I examine two interrelated and contradictory facets of these complex processes of national reconstitution, namely the transformation of Portugal into a receiver of immigrants and the incorporation of the Portuguese diaspora into a global nation spread across the world. Utilizing a two play act rhetorical device, I focus on two interlinked social dramas that evoked broad, though differential, media attention as they highlighted the ancestral ambivalent relations between former imperial metropolis and former colony, rooted in the «reversal of the colonial pact», as well as their shifting positions in the global economy.
The first act of the play begins with the 1993 diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil when, upon the issuing of a new Foreigners Law in Portugal, «undesirable» Brazilians began to be detained by the Portuguese Foreigners and Frontiers Office and returned to Brazil. This foreign law was an outcome of Portugal's alignment to Schengen. And while incarceration and deportations of Brazilians trying to pass through closed gates have proliferated in the post 9/11 period, this was the first notorious case of group extradition within the emerging Brazilian diaspora. Given the ambivalent relations between the two «sister» countries, entangled by the colonial past and the long history of Portuguese migration to Brazil, this dramatic event provoked intense commotion in both countries. In comparison, the second act, set in the late 1990's, focuses on the recreations of Portugueseness among the Portuguese and LusoBrazilian leadership of São Paulo as Portuguese enterprises and capital have increasingly headed to Brazil -a movement suggestively portrayed by the Brazilian media as the «Return of the Caravels». While each play «act» highlights a recurring reaffirmation of imperial continuities, jointly the two act drama point to a process of Empire reconfiguration as central to the ways governmental officials have negotiated Portugal's position in the global economy.
This analysis is a result of my dialogues with different fields of study: globalization, Empire, post-colonialism, diasporas. It has also unfolded from my long term research among the Portuguese of New England (USA). Yet, from that location, I was able to grasp especially one dimension of the reconfiguration of the Portuguese post-colonial nation -that related to the so-called «Immigrant Portugal». From that viewpoint, I documented the incorporation of Portuguese emigrants in the creation of a global deterritorialized post-colonial nation based on population rather than territory. My findings corroborated those of interlocutors who were examining the nation-state reconstruction projects of former colonies. However, as Portugal is a former [albeit decaying] Empire, I further recognized that the construction of a global nation spread across the world has been rooted in the reinvention of the collective memory of saudade (nostalgia for the discoveries) as the basis of Portuguese national (imperial) identity. On that account, I suggested that the incorporation of the Portuguese diaspora into the post-colonial «global» nation has replaced the former overseas colonies in the spatial (re) imagining of the former space of the Empire (Feldman-Bianco, 1992 , 1995 .
But as I turned to compare the reversed transmigrations between Brazil and Portugal, I was confronted with unveiling their entangled colonial past. At first, I followed Santos' (1993 Santos' ( , 1994 advice on the need for taking into account Portugal's semi-peripheral positioning in the wider economy to scrutinize its alleged lack of differentiation from former colonies, particularly in relation to Brazil. But since the interdependencies between imperial metropolis and different colonial sites, as well as between former metropolis and former colonies, have specific histories, positions and relations of power, I focus attention on the specific interdependencies and mutual constitution between Portugal and Brazil and their shifting locations in the wider political scene. I also engaged in dialogues with students of the so-called post-colonial moment, who have tended to examine yet another dimension of the national redefinition process, that referring to the presence of immigrants from former colonies in the ex-imperial metropoles. But given their interests in the supplementary narrations of the nation (Bhabba, 1994) and, thus, in building histories that challenge the constructed homogeneities (C. Hall, 1996) , they have emphasized solely the cultural production of difference.
In contraposition, my option to compare two different diasporic situations between Portugal and Brazil has enabled me to analyze both the incorporation of Portuguese transnational migrants into the nation, and Portugal's transformation into a receiver of immigrants from its former colonies and thus two dimensions of national redefinition. Given the continuous production of ambiguous cultural borders between Portugal and Brazil, it became imperative to scrutinize the production of sameness, as well as of difference, between the two countries. From that view, in my attempts to decipher the interstices and intricacies underlying power, domination, subordination, inclusion, instead of centralizing attention solely on the cultural production of difference (Bhabba, 1994; C. Hall, 1996) , my analysis also depicts the ways in which homogeneity, i. e. hegemony has been constructed (Feldman-Bianco, 2001 , 2002 . I hence take into account the development of national policies and elite discourses regarding the hegemonic constructions of national belonging in both nations. From this perspective, I examine the power relations between former imperial metropolis and its major creation, against the background of the multiple and differential movements of people, symbols and capital. By placing these dramas within this broader scenery, I attempt to juxtapose policies, politics, movements, restriction of movements, and events concerning immigration and emigration in order to unfold the complexities underlying the relationships among transnationalism, diasporas, and processes of national redefinition in this conjecture of globalization. Above all, such an analysis constitutes an attempt to unite questions on diasporas, with questions on Empire and post-colonialism as part of the same problem under study.
Within this broader framework, the diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil brought to light the tensions and contradictions provoked by the institutional changes that marked the end of empire and that turned Portugal into a European post-colonial nation. The 1992 Foreign Law collided blatantly with the existing 1972 Bilateral Equal Rights Treaty between Portugal and Brazil, exposing Portugal's dilemma of being caught between the European agenda -which implies tightly controlling entry of former colonial subjectsnow defined as non-EC foreigners -and its former location as a colonial and diasporic center, which entails privileging the exchange of people, goods, and capital with non-European states that had once been subjected to Portuguese rule. The analysis of these conflicts allowed me to discern the contradictions between, on the one hand, the subordination of Portugal to EC policies that demand the fortification of European borders and favor the rights of roots and, on the other hand, its transformation into a receptor of the diasporic population from Brazil (as well as from other former colonies of Africa) linked to the former metropolis by fictive ties of shared descent and long history of Portuguese emigration.
An analysis of these conflicts necessarily begins with an examination of who was barred from entry in Portugal. The fact that the first group of 11 deportees were mostly of the Brazilian lower classes, were either unemployed or had lowpaid jobs in Brazil, and came from Governador Valadares (a Minas Gerais town with a large number of transnational migrants), indicated that selective entrance, rooted in stigmatized meanings and practices, in terms of class, gender and color, starts already at the customhouse. At first, Brazilian diplomacy tried to minimize the incidents demanding only punishment for the Portuguese customs officers.
The crisis began to unfold when an assertion made by the Portuguese Ambassador in Brazil, characterizing the expatriated Brazilians as «vagrants and mulatinhas (mulatto women) wearing mini-skirts» made the news (Jornal do Brasil, 1993) . These remarks incited angry exchanges and mutual accusations, thus exposing the contradictions, inequalities and differences between the two nations, which are often masked by assertions of sameness.
«Vagrants» and «mulattos» as well as «hordes of Blacks and little monkeys» were ways in which Portuguese in Portugal described Brazil's population during the period Brazil declared its independence and the First Republic. These types of provocation differentiated civilized white Europeans from the «non-civilized» Brazilians or «Portuguese from Brazil», as the population from Brazil was called prior and during the Independence period (Ribeiro, 1994b (Ribeiro, , 2000 . These gendered and racist stereotypes began to be updated and recreated in Portugal in the 1980s, as the Portuguese confronted the competition of Brazilian immigrants -the so-called Brazucas-in the labor market.
In reaction, Brazilians ridiculed the cultural and economic backwardness of their onetime colonial masters. Such negative remarks, together with clichéd comic images and jokes portraying the Portuguese as «ignorant» and «rude», were first fabricated in Brazil in the nineteenth century, at a time when slave labor began to be replaced by free immigrant labor, among whom were masses of Portuguese laborers (Ribeiro, 1994 (Ribeiro, , 1999 Rowland, 1998; Vieira, 1991) . Later, in the passage from monarchy to the First Republic in Brazil (l899-1930) , old stereotypes were recreated. Brazilians characterized Portugal as a backward nation, while Portuguese immigrants were depicted as greedy businessmen blocking Brazil's «progress». During the 1993 diplomatic conflicts, these mutual prejudices and hostilities were updated and exacerbated.
A cartoon, published just a few days after the Portuguese ambassador's injudicious characterizations of the Brazilians detained at the Lisbon airport, illustrated a Portuguese caravel, displaying Brazilian flags, attacked by all sorts of domestic utensils as it approaches Portuguese ground. It captures the sense that the 1993 diplomatic conflicts were fundamentally a «domestic drama». This drama has been constantly informed by reinterpretations of the interrelated histories of Portuguese colonialism and immigration in Brazil. These have been based on the recurring production of reciprocal stereotyping. Historically, in Portugal, stereotypes of Brazil and Brazilians were fabricated upon biased images of Brazil's Portuguese immigrants (Vieira, 1991) . Since the 1980's, the old cliches have been overlaid with negative characterizations of the «Brazuca», the «new» Brazilian immigrant. As Portugal has returned to (white) Europe, characterizations of the «Brazucas» as tropical mulattos are based, once again, on race and degree of civilization.
In the midst of these angry exchanges, a public statement by the [then] Prime Minister Cavaco Silva claiming that, «Portugal tries to fight the entry of drugs, criminality and marginality; especially, I am sorry to say it, of the transvestites» (Folha de São Paulo, 1993b) escalated the crisis. The Brazilian government reacted with revenge, threatening to break the 1972 Equal Rights Bilateral Treaty. With the retaliations and attempts at pacification, the latent contradictions between the existing responsibilities towards Europe and the existing responsibilities towards «the nations of Portuguese Official Expression» were exposed. Also, the political cleavages between Portugal's Prime Minister and President became apparent. Although the intentions of both were to turn Portugal into a modern European nation, and the President had signed the Foreign Law, their strategies differed with respect to the reconfiguration of the former empire. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva´s discourses and strategies to «Assert Portugal in the World» reflected Portugal's alignment with and subordination to the European community's policies. Hence, the formulation of the 1992 Foreign Law by the Ministry of Internal Administration reflected his stance towards the Schengen agreement. However, this law was also part of broader institutional changes that started in 1981 when the Portuguese government began to «undo the Empire» and adjust its legislation to the requirements of the European community. In contrast, while President Mario Soares was the main architect of the «turn to Europe», he nonetheless took into account Portugal's former positioning in the Atlantic -thus, its imperial continuities. His stand was that «the communitarian norms and directives should be respected (Soares, 1987) . Yet Portugal has the duty of humanizing those directives by giving special attention to the Portuguese speaking citizens» (Folha de São Paulo, 1993b) .
Attempts at pacification and reconciliation were grounded in the usual rhetoric of brotherhood between the two countries, based on shared history, language and culture. Portuguese politicians and intellectuals, allied to President Soares, emphasized that «500 hundred years of historical vocation could not be destroyed by (Portugal's) obligations towards Europe» (Folha de São Paulo, 1993a) . In the same manner, the Brazilian Ambassador in Portugal stressed the bonds of descent between Portugal and Brazil, indeed questioning Portuguese border-control with respect to the entry of Brazilians to Portugal, stating, «The image created in 500 years of relationships cannot be administered by the Foreigners and Borders Service at the Portela Airport even because Brazilians are not foreigners in Portugal» (Folha de São Paulo, 1993a) . By calling attention to the common «historical roots» between Portugal and Brazil, the ambassador superimposed Portugal's more ambiguous cultural borders over the nation's rigid territorial borders. Claiming sameness between Portuguese and Brazilians, he challenged the construction of Brazilians as foreign «oth-ers». In similar ways, the varied self-identifications of Brazilians in Portugal, as well Portuguese in Brazil, reflect the ambiguities resultant from the constant production of sameness as well as immigrants' transnational networks of kinship and marriage between Brazil and Portugal. Moreover, given these transnational bonds, the granting of dual citizenship and nationality rights by the Portuguese post-colonial state to the Portuguese spread across the world, based upon a broad definition of kinship and descent, blurred even more the cultural borders between the two countries. Thus, to express oneself as the «same» or as the foreign «other», to consider oneself an «immigrant», a «resi-dent with equal rights», a «Luso-Brazilian», «Portuguese-Brazilian», a «Portuguese with a Brazilian soul», or a «militant Luso-Brazilian», becomes a question of positioning and social location. In comparison, in the United States, where the Portuguese as well as the Brazilians are more distant from the arenas of dominant political and economic power, the category «immigrant» rigidly differentiates Americans from non-Americans, further contrasting with the more flexible and ambiguous «Luso-Brazilian» category.
Overall, the tensions and contradictions brought to the fore by the diplomatic conflicts restated and exacerbated existing cleavages among different nationalist ideologies about what the Portuguese nation should be (Fox, 1990 ). Yet, the contests and accommodations have ultimately helped to assert the predominance of a conciliatory nationalist ideology, defended by President Mario Soares and segments of the Socialist Party, laying stress on the incorporation of the former Atlantic project into the new European nation project. Consequently, the recreation of Portuguese national culture has rested on imperial continuities.
Brazilian diplomats along with the leading citizens of Luso-Brazilian associations actively participated in asserting Portuguese imperial continuities. According to their specific social locations and interests, these citizens attempted to respond to the conflicts by defending immigrants' rights in Portugal, the maintenance of the rights acquired by Portuguese in Brazil, or the movements and interests of capital.
Since the interplay of ambiguous identities have provided «room to maneuver» for the production of both sameness and otherness, the protagonists appealed to their common roots to soften the differences between Brazil and Portugal. Invariably, the appeals of sameness have reaffirmed the bounds of common descent, shared culture history, and specially, language. The production of cultural sameness between the two countries brought to the fore the perseverance and strengths of the Portuguese imperial phantom.
In their reconstitution of the common bounds of descent between Portugal and Brazil, Brazilians and bicultural «Portuguese from Brazil» alike sought to superimpose the former empire over the post-colonial European nation. In this way, they have attempted to disguise the immanent contradictions and incompatibilities between the former Portuguese empire and the post-colonial nation. Towards this end, they resorted to Agostinho da Silva´s expansionist perspective on post-colonial Portugal. A bicultural Portuguese from Brazil, who favored Atlantism, Agostinho da Silva transmuted poet Fernando Pessoa's aphorism, «the fatherland is my language», along with the specific historically constructed non-differentiation between Portugal and Brazil, to encompass the entire (former) Portuguese empire. In this way, the Empire was reconstructed in post-colonial times as a homogeneous territory of the Portuguese language, despite the diverse histories and specific interdependencies between the former metropolis and its different colonies. Insofar as that same metaphor was used to legitimize the incorporation of the Portuguese diaspora within the post-colonial nation, the ambivalence circumscribing the connection between nation and former empire became more accentuated.
The recreation of the Portuguese empire as a territory of Portuguese language, at a historical conjunction inscribed by the deportation of «undesir-able» immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies, extended well beyond the bilateral relations between Brazil and Portugal, as well as a supposed LusoBrazilian unity. On the one hand, this reconstruction enabled lusophone immigrant associations in Portugal to claim their rights to «common roots». Despite Portugal's differing imperial projects with its different colonies, and the different social locations and needs of the populations they represented, mobilization in favor of differential treatment for Portuguese-speaking immigrants united lusophone immigrant leaders around a «No borders Movement». By resorting to the Portuguese language as a metaphor of the «bonds of blood» (and thus of common descent) the movement began to demand rights to common historical roots without ever referring to any colonial debts or exploitation. No mention was made of the fact that the Portuguese language is also the basis for the production of significant differences between Portuguese and Brazilians. By reaffirming cultural sameness through an emphasis on common language as a bond of blood, they actively invested in the production of homogeneity between former metropolis and colonies, The reaffirmation of cultural sameness through an emphasis on common language as a bond of blood (and, thus questioning their foreignness) was a major strategy in their battle against the continuing deportation of illegal immigrants, the threats of expatriation of «legal immigrants whose acts were considered attempts against national security», as well as the pending creation of temporary shelter centers that were already at the forefront of their struggle. Thereby, they actively participated in the production of imperial continuities in post-colonial Portugal. While challenging the Portuguese European project, the imperial reconfigurations were aimed at enabling Portuguese-speaking immigrants to remain in Portugal and move freely within the European economic regional block. Above all, the defense of Atlanticism has benefited those favoring a nationalistic ideology that viewed the European project as resting upon imperial continuities.
On the other hand, the conflation of nation and former empire in the present state of global capitalism has further entangled efforts and contests around the creation of a supranational Lusophone Community of Nations. This new supranational territory of the Portuguese language, meaningfully known as a Community of Feelings, represents the new face of the Portuguese empire in times of economic globalization. Following the resolution of conflicts and the affirmation of cultural sameness between Brazil and Portugal, the Brazilian Ambassador in Portugal advocated the formation of such a supranational block. At that time, the Brazilian diplomatic drive gained the support of both LusoBrazilian associations aiming at the promotion of the Portuguese language and the expansion of markets and lusophone immigrants struggling for special treatment in Portugal. However, under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state increasingly turned attention to the formation of Mercosul, the South American regional economic block, rather than the socalled «Portuguese Speaking World». Meanwhile, with the victory of the Socialist Party in the 1996 central elections and the consolidation of a conciliatory national ideology, lusophony became the dominant Portuguese state ideology. It was only years later that the Brazilian and Portuguese states would join efforts in order to take advantage of their respective locations in the Mercosul and European Union to work towards strengthening inter-regional cooperation.
The sequence of events after the Socialist Party victory in the 1996 general elections and the ensuing triumph of a national project favoring conciliation between the European and the Atlantic projects, revealed the limits of the politics of sameness. The events suggest that the lusophone immigrant leadership in Portugal unwittingly shared in the dialectics of both incorporation and exclusion. Ironically, the regularization processes of illegal transmigrants and the granting of differential treatment to Portuguese-speaking immigrants enabled incumbent governmental officers to limit inclusion to representatives of just a few lusophone immigrant associations. On this basis, Portuguese post-colonial policies, under the Socialist Party government, continued to conform to European norms. Accordingly, government officers, viewing «undesirable» transmigrants as a matter of national and supranational security, increased control over territorial borders. At the same time, human rights policies, giving special prominence to intercultural dialogues, multiculturalism, and fights against xenophobia and racism, were directed only to those legal transmigrants who had already settled in Portugal.
It is important to note, however, that these European multicultural policies were redefined in the light of Gilberto Freyre´s notion of Lusotropicalism, an ideology first elaborated for explaining Brazilian cultural history but that, nevertheless, during late colonialism was transferred to the New State relations with its African overseas domains. Directing its advertising campaigns mostly to the largely Lisbon-based immigrant populations of «Portuguese Africa», the Socialist Party government implicitly referred to Portuguese plasticity and to positive miscegenation so as to reiterate cultural homogeneity between for-mer colonizer and colonized. In this way, governmental officers have attempted to disguise the continuing production of racial categories and hierarchies still based on color gradations. As the status of many immigrants was regularized, they were granted the right to vote at the local level. In view of the existing alliances between the Socialist party and the Portuguese speaking immigrant leaders (some of whom became members of that party) and the continuous subjection of the Portuguese post-colonial state to the European communitarian norms, the lusophone movement lost its strength. Meanwhile, since the late 1990s, in addition to the growing numbers of lower class Brazilians, increasing numbers of East European and non-Portuguese African immigrants have illegally settled in Portugal. In the year 2000, the government increased control over territorial borders. The Service of Foreigners and Borders became a criminal police department and its officiers became as policemen. But recognizing the need of foreign labor, the government issued a new and more rigid decree by which the admission of immigrant labor was to be allowed only on the basis of temporary work contracts, devoid of basic citizenship rights. This decree divided the already weakened lusophone immigrant movement even more. At the same time, in view of the new contours of the incoming immigrant population, existing opposition to the ongoing differential treatment directed to Portuguese-speaking immigrants came flagrantly to light. Instead of differential treatment for the Portuguese-speaking immigrants, the new movement started to claim «Equal rights, documents for all» and «slavery no». Within this scenery, Brazilian immigrant leaders renewed their struggles for bilateral equal rights reciprocity, fighting at the same time for citizenship rights in Brazil. An accord of reciprocal work contracts was signed in 2003 to benefit illegal Brazilians in Portugal (some 15.000 people) and illegal Portuguese in Brazil. This accord included a model of legalization of Brazilian immigrants resident in Portugal, through a work contract. The treaty for reciprocal work contract was seen as «a sign of friendship between the two countries». Within the continuing hierarchy Portugal imposes on the former colonies, Brazilians have continued to occupy the highest rank, accenting the ambiguity of their relationship with Portugal.
The interchanges between cultural sameness and difference mark the Return of the Caravels, which stirs, in the second act, the dramatic new reversed crossings of people, symbols, and capital between Portugal and Brazil. In the context of those reversed crossings in the global economy, Portuguese governmental officers have reconstructed old imperial imageries as a way of re-creating Portugal as a «modern» European nation. The official narratives today bring together the politics of high culture and the politics of investments. A more recent 2007 Immigration Law was expanded to allow all immigrants who were entitled to an extraordinary regularization process but have not yet gained legal status to seek a temporary residence visa. At the same time that preference is still given to those immigrants «who speak the Portuguese language» and thereby to immigrants coming from Community of Portuguese Speaking Nations, it is worthwhile to point out that during its Portuguese Presidency, «the UE will strengthen its political, economic and diplomatic relations with Brazil, including the discussion of immigration as an important theme for cooperation, since one of the most important migratory flows to Portugal and some other European countries are from Brazil» (Notícias, 16-06-2007) . They represent yet another reconfiguration of an expansionist Portuguese nationalism. In view of the ongoing internationalization of the economy, the Portuguese post-colonial state, together with Portugal's investors and enterprises, have turned once more to the former colonial spaces, which have today been transmuted into a supranational «Portuguese language territory». Accordingly, the cultural sameness between former colonizer and its major colony has been evoked against the background of a lusophone world. As the Brazilian government began sponsoring the politics of privatization, Brazil, long viewed by the Portuguese as its «major creation», has further turned into the major market for Portugal's investors and enterprises. Without its burden of colonialism, capitalist Portugal's future seems to be in Brazil.
This territory of the Portuguese language has also included the Portuguese diaspora. For more than a century, endless debate asked whether emigration was a problem or a solution for the nation-state dilemmas. Although the former Portuguese colonial state considered its emigrants as «second» and «third» rate citizens, emigrants remittances, together with the «market of nostalgia» were for more than a century the main sources of Portugal's revenues. After the end of empire, the diasporic population was incorporated into a European nation based on common descent, rather than territory. Along with their acquired full dual nationality rights, Portuguese immigrants, were given a dual responsibility: «to integrate in(to) the host society without assimilating and to establish the presence of Portugal in the world» (Aguilar, 1986) . At first that incorporation, besides making possible the reconstruction of imperial Portugal's «magical dimension» (Lourenço, 1978) aimed at promoting social justice and citizens' rights. While this incorporation has represented a drastic change from the former dictatorial regime's exclusionary policies towards emigrants, some reconstructed continuity remains. Post-colonial Portuguese authorities have tried to capitalize on the inclusion of dispersed Portuguese into the nation. Like the New State dictatorship, the Portuguese governmental authorities have delimited differing access to Portuguese associations in dialogues and negotiations with the post-colonial state. Moreover, as they have progressively focused on leading citizens capable of playing roles as transnational brokers for the Portuguese state and its entrepreneurial missions, these successful Portuguese have been portrayed once more as «heroic entrepreneurs» and equated to the «heroes of the sea».
In a similar manner, surpassing the previous market for nostalgia and the demand for immigrants' remittances to Portugal (which nevertheless still make up 30% of the Portuguese economy), Portuguese enterprises and investors looking for the broader Brazilian markets have also relied on some long-established associations in the diaspora. They have also begun to consider the Portuguese in Brazil as potential clients and consumers. In the context of the ongoing interest in the Brazilian market and the possibility of joint ventures, government officials have renewed emphasis on the rhetoric of brotherhood binding Brazil and Portugal and, thus, on the production of sameness. But the ongoing policies of the Portuguese government, along with increased Portuguese investments in Brazil, have at the same time helped to revive Portugueseness and, as a corollary, the production of cultural differences between Portuguese and Brazilians. Given Portugal's «metamorphosis» into a modern and prosperous European nation and the ongoing recreation of old images centering on a revived Atlantic universal vocation, the renewed differentiation again places emphasis on the Portuguese as white European colonizers, responsible for the evangelization and, thus, «civilization» of Brazil. Although stereotyped and farcical, this recreation fits with the present construction of a nationalism that joins the politics of investment and the marketing of high culture. This national reconfiguration implicitly portrays Portugal as European -civilized and white-inasmuch as Portuguese officials in their attempts to construct homogeneity have once again promoted positive miscegenation and, therefore, have attempted to disguise the actual bonds between race and nation.
However, it is important to point out that some elderly political activists at the 25 of April Cultural Center still contest this national construction. During the New State dictatorship, those political activists had ceaselessly denounced the prevailing exaltation of Portugal's New World discoveries, and of Portugal's role as a colonizer. Activists also criticized the conservative traditionalism of Portuguese folklore. Presently, in view of the increasing politics of high culture and the possibility of obtaining governmental grants, Portuguese national culture has become a contested domain. In view of their long involvement in cultural activities during the dictatorship -when political obscurantism, censorship, and repression limited cultural expression, these activists saw themselves as the legitimate producers of Portuguese culture in Brazil and, as such, the privileged mediators between Portugal and Brazilian society. Reaffirming their social position as anti-salazarists, they critically examined the Portuguese presence in Brazil, both in their roles as colonizers and as economic or political immigrants. In the context of this reevaluation, they have been especially interested in highlighting the century-long contributions of the Portuguese intellectuals exiled in Brazil, in the arts, sciences, humanities, and technology, «not as colonizers, but rather as a result of cultural exchanges between Brazilians and Portuguese».
Yet, the ongoing competition among Luso-Brazilians for positions, resources, and representations within Portugal and Portuguese national culture has remained confined to a small number of the diaspora's leading citizens. The majority of the Portuguese population of São Paulo has remained far removed from the political scene. Independently of their political positions, affluent and influential citizens have tended to consider the masses of Portuguese immigrants and descendants who do not belong to an association or do not have a prominent public role in the associative life as «invisible». In this way, they have helped exclude perhaps unintentionally the majority of Portuguese from the political arena.
In this essay, I have examined the contradictions, ambiguities, and accommodations underlying the remodeling of Portugal from an imperial metropolis to a European post-colonial nation. The focus on two different diasporic situations in-between Portugal and Brazil has enabled me to analyze two interrelated facets of these complex processes of national redefinition: the incorporation of Portuguese transnational migrants into the nation and, in this context, Portugal's transformation into a receiver of immigrants from former colonies. The analyses of both situations revealed that the emigration and immigration policies of the Portuguese post-colonial state are constitutive of the ways in which governmental officers have negotiated Portugal's position in the global economy. Dramatized in two acts, these situations depict different moments of the remodeling of a nation anchored on European community norms. The first disclosed a historical conjuncture of intense ideological disputes about «what the Portuguese nation should be»; and, the second indicated that the present configuration of Portuguese nationalism increasingly intersects with the politics of investments and the marketing of Portuguese high culture.
Drawing on this built-in paradox, I tried to discern the recurring productions of sameness and difference against the ongoing politics of incorporation and exclusion engendered by the reconfiguration of Portuguese nationalism. Such an inquiry revealed that, albeit their different locations and political struggles, transnational migrant leaders have participated in the production of imperial continuities and, hence, underscored the limits of the politics of sameness. Above all, these play acts bring to the fore the reconstitution of ideologies of Empire within new political configurations in this era of contemporary globalization, a process that deserves urgent comparative studies.
